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Abstract
We augment a closed-economy DSGE model with collateral constraints tied to real es-
tate values by incorporating the time-to-build phenomenon in the housing construction sector.
Adding construction sector delays signicantly improves business cycle properties of the model
relative to the versions with no time-to-build delays or with permanently xed housing stock.
We also nd that in the presence of construction lags adding housing prices to the central bank
policy function increases aggregate welfare in the economy by up to 0.3 percent of consumption.
This result is robust to several specications of the Taylor rule and to changes in key parameter
values.
Key words: Housing prices, housing construction, time-to-build, welfare.
JEL classication: E32, E44, E52, E58.
Acknowledgement 1 We would like to thank the participants of the Southern Economic
Association meeting in San Antonio (especially Enrique Martínez-García and Alex Nikolsko-
Rzhevsky), Eastern Economic Association meeting in Philadelphia, Midwest Macroeconomics
Meeting in East Lansing and seminar participants at the University of Georgia, University of
Wisconsin-Whitewater, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Davidson College and University
of Richmond for valuable comments and suggestions. All remaining mistakes are our own.
1 Introduction
In many industrialized countries, the last two decades have been characterized by a surge, followed
by a sharp downward adjustment, of housing prices. Insofar as developments in the housing sector
have a signicant e¤ect on the rest of the economic activity (as has been clearly demonstrated by
the current nancial crisis), many researchers have attempted to elucidate the linkages between real
estate market and other sectors of the economy.1 Of particular interest is the question of whether
monetary policy should react to uctuations in housing prices in order to improve consumer welfare.2
However, very few authors in either strand of the literature have explicitly modeled both sides of
the housing market, with the majority of papers focusing only on housing demand. The risk of such
simplied approach is that policy implications, especially prescriptions for central banks, may be
Please address correspondence to: Olena Mykhaylova, Department of Economics, 1 Gateway Road, University
of Richmond, VA 23173. Email: omykhayl@richmond.edu.
1A non-exhaustive list of recent work includes Campbell and Cocco (2007), Carstensen et al. (2009), Davis and
Heathcote (2005), Goodhart and Hofmann (2007), Iacoviello (2005) and Monacelli (2009).
2See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (2001), Cecchetti (2007), Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) and Roubini (2006).
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misleading, as we will demonstrate below. Our main thesis is that incorporating construction sector
and, in particular, the time-to-build phenomenon, into economic models is crucial for understanding
housing price dynamics and for evaluating the appropriateness of central bank responses to the
latter.
According to industry reports, commercial and residential construction projects often take mul-
tiple months (or even years) to complete, and most residential home construction is nished before
a buyer is found.3 Consequently, housing construction sector cannot respond instantaneously to
changes in demand for real estate.4 Unfortunately, very few papers on the housing market incorpo-
rate these facts into the models. While the time-to-build technology in the production function has
been the topic of numerous papers (see, for example, Kydland and Prescott (1982)), to date only
Gomme et al. (2001) has explored time delays in residential investment; the authors demonstrate
that adding delays to a household-production real business cycle (RBC) model greatly improves
its ability to replicate data on household and market capital stock expenditures. Despite these
ndings, many recent papers, including Aoki, Proudman and Vlieghe (2004), Iacoviello and Neri
(2010) and Monacelli (2009) model the construction sector without any time delays.5
Based on these observations, we ll the gap in the literature by building a New Keynesian dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with housing construction sector characterized
by long delays between the commencement and completion of any given project. As a result, the
construction sector incurs the risk to its prots from unexpected future housing price uctuations,
and therefore must make investment decisions (which a¤ect the future supply of housing) in a
forward-looking manner. We show that such delays lead to lower responsiveness of housing supply
following economic shocks, to higher housing price volatility and to reduced welfare of consumers.
We also show that incorporating time-to-build feature into the construction sector is critical in
matching the business cycle properties of housing market variables.
We then turn to the question of monetary policy conduct. Most modern central banks have
price stability as their primary goal; however, generally they do not explicitly target housing prices.
Recently, several papers have pursued the question of the transmission process between housing
prices and monetary policy. Bernanke and Gertler (2001) famously postulate that the central bank
should only react to housing prices insofar as they help to predict future ination. Gilchrist and
Leahy (2002) consider three general arguments for including asset prices in monetary policy rules:
asset prices belong in a measure of the price level, asset prices forecast ination, and there may
exist structural links between asset prices, consumption and investment. While they conclude that
the third argument is important, the authors nd that it does not alone provide a reason for basing
monetary policy on asset prices. Iacoviello (2005) studies the improvements in ination-output gap
variance frontiers and nds only marginal benets from having central bank respond to housing
prices.
In order to assess potential gains to consumers from stabilizing housing prices, we modify the
policy rule followed by the central bank by including in it real housing appreciation and compute
the resulting changes in welfare.6 We nd that, present non-zero lags in the construction sector,
including housing prices in the monetary policy rule is welfare enhancing. This result is robust
3First Research Industry Prole - Residential Real Estate Construction, Quarterly Update, 2/23/2009, and First
Research Industry Prole - Commercial Construction Contractors, Quarterly Update, 2/23/2009.
4Some qualitative support for this phenomenon is also o¤ered in Esteban and Altuzarra (2008).
5One exception is Davis and Heathcote (2005), who include a one-period (in their model, a year) construction
delay, but do not study its impact on the dynamics of the model.
6The only paper we are aware of that explicitly computes changes household welfare is Mendicino and Pescatori
(2008); the authors do not nd any welfare improvements from housing price stabilization.
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to several specications of the Taylor rule and to changes in parameter values. The key nding
is explained both by the presence of houses in consumer utility functions and by the fact that
collateralized borrowing of credit-constrained households depends crucially on the expected value
of their future real estate holdings. Long delays in construction decrease the responsiveness of
housing supply and increase uctuations of housing prices and consequently of borrowing limits.
The central bank is able to increase total welfare by reacting to uctuations in housing prices.
Moreover, we show that welfare gains are non-linear in the duration of construction lags; the gains
are very close to zero in the versions of the model with no lags in construction, and with no
construction sector (the two setups used widely in existing literature).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the theoretical model is presented in section
2; section 3 discusses calibration; section 4 presents the results of our simulations and robustness
exercises. Finally, concluding remarks are contained in section 5.
2 The Model
The core of our model is based on Iacoviello (2005). The closed economy is populated by two
types of innitely lived households (patient and impatient) and by entrepreneurs; each group is of
measure 1. All agents consume real estate and all varieties of local goods, the latter being produced
by perfectly competitive entrepreneurs using labor, real estate and capital. These goods are then
resold by retailers at a mark-up. Households o¤er their labor services to labor unions, which then
resell the services to employers at a higher rate. Retail prices and wages are sticky à la Calvo
(1983). The central bank sets the interest rate in response to ination and output gap uctuations.
The new feature is the addition of the housing construction sector, which uses labor and land
and borrows from consumers in order to build and sell houses to households and entrepreneurs,
thus adding dynamics to the supply side of the real estate market. Labor is fully mobile between
the two sectors of the economy: goods production and housing construction.
2.1 Households
We model two types of households, di¤erentiated by their intertemporal discount factor : patient
(p) and impatient (m), with 0 < m < p < 1. Each type of household is of measure one;
notationally, superscript p will indicate variables pertaining to patient households, and superscript
m will denote variables of impatient households.
A representative household maximizes expected lifetime utility
U jt = E0
1X
t=0

j
t8><>:
h
Cjt
i1 
1   
h
Ljt
i1+
1 + 
+ 
h
Hjt
i1 
1 
9>=>; ; (1)
for j 2 fp;mg :7 Here Cjt denotes the households consumption of the composite good, which
is aggregated from home varieties using the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator dened in section 2.3. Hjt
denotes the stock of housing (real estate). Households supply di¤erentiated labor services Ljt to
entrepreneurs and the construction sector via labor unions, described below.
7Following Woodford (2003), Chapter 3, we model monetary policy as directly targeting interest rates and therefore
drop real balances from the consumer utility function.
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Each patient household faces the following budget constraint:
QtH
p
t + 
p
h;t + PtC
p
t  Bpt + PtIkt + K;t =W pt Lpt  Rt 1Bpt 1 +RK;tKt 1 +Drt +Dut +Dct (2)
The rst two terms on the left-hand side capture the expenditure on additional housing plus the
adjustment costs jh;t  2

Hjt
Hjt 1
2
QtH
j
t 1, j 2 fp;mg. Bjt represents households borrowing,
given the nominal interest rate Rt:8 Patient households own capital Kt, which they rent out to
entrepreneurs at a market rate RK;t and which evolves according to
Kt = (1  )Kt 1 + Ikt (3)
Here, the investment good Ikt has the same composition as consumption. Capital accumulation is
subject to adjustment costs K;t  Pt  2
h
Ikt
Kt 1
  
i2
Kt 1. Finally, Drt , D
u
t and D
c
t are prots of
retailers, labor unions and the construction sector, respectively (described below).
Patient households maximize utility (1) subject to the constraints (2) and (3) by choosing labor
e¤ort Lpt , consumption C
p
t , and investment positions B
p
t , H
p
t and I
k
t . The rst order conditions
for this problem are described in Appendix B.
Impatient householdsbudget constraint is
QtH
m
t + 
m
h;t + PtC
m
t +Rt 1B
m
t 1 =W
m
t L
m
t +B
m
t (4)
Impatient households face an additional credit constraint that limits the amount of borrowing,
which cannot exceed a fraction lm of the expected discounted value of their real estate holdings:
Bmt  lmEt

Qt+1H
m
t
Rt

where lm is assumed to be xed and known. We assume that m < p, which implies that impatient
households discount future more heavily than the patient households. This guarantees that the
former are constrained in and around the steady state. Specically, the fact that (1=m) > Rt
causes the Lagrange multiplier on the credit constraint to be greater than zero. Therefore, the
borrowing constraint will hold with equality:
Bmt = l
mEt

Qt+1H
m
t
Rt

(5)
Mortgage loans are renanced each period.
Impatient households maximize utility (1) subject to the constraints (4) and (5) by choosing
labor e¤ort Lmt , consumption C
m
t , and investment positions B
m
t and H
m
t . The corresponding
rst order conditions are listed in Appendix B.
2.2 Entrepreneurs
Each country has a continuum of entrepreneurs on the interval [0; 1]. At time t, each entrepreneur
uses the stock of real estate Het and hires labor inputs N
p
e;t and N
m
e;t and capital stock Kt 1 at the
corresponding rates W pt , W
m
t and RK;t to produce one of the varieties of the domestic good:
Yt = At

Ket 1
 
Npe;t
(1  v) 
Nme;t
(1 )(1  v) 
Het 1

(6)
8We assume that p is su¢ ciently high to induce patient households to save in the steady state, while impatient
households will choose to borrow.
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Here At denotes the level of productivity enjoyed by all the entrepreneurs at time t, which evolves
according to the following autoregressive process:
lnAt = a lnAt 1 + "
a
t
Npe;t and N
m
e;t are the patient and impatient household labor e¤orts, and  measures the relative
size of each group.9
Each entrepreneur maximizes
E0
1X
t=0
(e)t
(
[Cet ]
1 
1 
)
(7)
subject to the following ow of funds constraint:
P et Yt +B
e
t = PtC
e
t +QtH
e
t + 
e
h;t +W
p
t N
p
e;t +W
m
t N
m
e;t +Rt 1B
e
t 1 +RK;tKt 1; (8)
where eh;t  2
h
Het
Het 1
i2
QtH
e
t 1 captures housing adjustment costs. B
e
t and C
e
t denote the entre-
preneurs borrowing and consumption, and P et is the wholesale price of output. Similar to the
impatient households, entrepreneurs are also restricted in their borrowing due to enforceability
problems. The amount of borrowing cannot exceed a xed fraction of the discounted value of their
real estate holdings:
Bet  leEt

Qt+1H
e
t
Rt

(9)
In the presence of credit constraints, entrepreneurs can choose to postpone consumption and
quickly accumulate enough capital so that their credit constraint becomes nonbinding. In order to
make sure that entrepreneurial self-nancing does not arise, we assume that entrepreneurs discount
the future more heavily than patient households: e < p. As for impatient households, this
guarantees that the credit constraint is binding in and around the steady state.
Entrepreneurs maximize (7) subject to (6), (8) and (9); the solution to the entrepreneurs
problem can be found in Appendix B.
2.3 Retailers and Unions
In order to introduce nominal rigidities, we model a retail sector following Bernanke et al. (1999).
Each of the monopolistically competitive retailers (indexed by r on the interval [0; 1]) buys one of
the varieties produced by the entrepreneurs and resells it to the consumers and investors at the
optimally determined price Pt(r). These varieties are bundled into a composite good using the
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt(r)
 1
 dr
 
 1
9Following Iacoviello (2005), we let hours of the two households enter the production function in a Cobb-Douglas
fashion. This assumption implies complementarity across the labor skills of the two groups and allows us to obtain
closed-form solutions for the steady state of the model. This form for the production function is also motivated by
the fact that credit-constrained households typically have low incomes. Hence, we parameterize  so that their share
in labor income is lower than that of the patient households.
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where  > 1. This composite good can then be used for consumption or investment. The price
of the bundle is given by Pt =
hR 1
0
Pt(r)
1 dr
i 1
1 
, and therefore demand for each of the varieties
is Y dt (r) =
h
Pt(r)
Pt
i 
Y dt . Here Y
d
t is the aggregate demand for the bundles from households and
investors.
As in Calvo (1983), retailers reset their prices each period with a constant probability (1 !p);
otherwise, the old prices remain in e¤ect. If a retailer r gets to announce a new price in period t,
she chooses ~Pt(r) to maximize her expected discounted future prots
Et
1X
j=t
[p!p]
j t #
p
j
#pt
nh
~Pt(r)  P ej
i
Y dj (r)
o
,
where #pt is the patient householdsmarginal utility of consumption: [#
p
t ]
 1
= [Cpt ]

Pt.
Given the price-setting behavior of individual retailers, the aggregate price index of the con-
sumption bundle can be written as
P 1 t = (1  !p) ~P 1 t + !pP 1 t 1
Wage rigidity is modeled analogously.10 Households sell their labor services to unions, who
then bundle and resell them to entrepreneurs and construction sector at the optimally determined
rate ~W jt (u) for j 2 fp;mg. Labor varieties are bundled into a composite good according to Ljt =hR 1
0
Ljt (u)
 1
 du
i 
 1
. Labor unions reset their wages each period with a constant probability (1 
!w); otherwise, the old wages remain in e¤ect. Similar to the price of the bundle of goods, the
expression for aggregate wage can be written ash
W jt
i1 
= (1  !w)
h
~W jt
i1 
+ !w
h
W jt 1
i1 
2.4 Housing Construction
The perfectly competitive domestic construction sector adds to the stock of real estate by using
labor of patient and impatient households and (a xed amount of) land T , which it owns, to produce
new housing:
Iht =

Npc;t
(1 ) 
Nmc;t
(1 )(1 )
T  (10)
Land in the production function serves as an adjustment cost to residential investment; we assume
that land is used as a service so that the amount of it available for production does not diminish
over time.11
The construction sector cannot respond instantaneously to an increase in demand for housing
(due, for example, to a positive development in the economy) since several steps are needed before
a new dwelling can be supplied in the market: obtaining permission for the development, securing
the loan, assembling the construction site, nalizing the project, and nally marketing the property.
10Modeling wage rigidity is necessary to generate a decline in residential investment following a domestic interest
rate shock (observed in the data). This result is in line with ndings of Barsky, House and Kimball (2007) and
Iacoviello and Neri (2009).
11An alternative setup (that would o¤er qualitatively similar results) is to introduce capital and/or investment
adjustment costs into the production function.
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Because of such delays between the commencement of a project and its completion, we assume that
the construction sector sells the houses begun in period t, Iht , with a k-period lag, in e¤ect taking
on the risk of unexpected future uctuations in the price of real estate. The prots (which may
deviate from zero because of this risk) therefore take the form
Dct = QtI
h
t k +B
c
t  W pt Npc;t  Wmt Nmc;t  Rt 1Bct 1 (11)
Here we assume that the price Qt adjusts to clear the market, so that all houses available for sale
in period t are bought by the consumers and entrepreneurs.
Due to uneven cash ow and inherent risk associated with real estate development, construction
sector frequently relies on borrowed funds.12 In our model, the amount of borrowing available to
the construction sector is limited to a fraction of the present discounted value of the houses that
will be ready for sale in the next period:
Bct = l
cEt
"
Qt+1I
h
t+1 k
Rt
#
(12)
Construction rms maximize (11) subject to (10) and (12) by choosing Bct , N
p
c;t and N
m
c;t. The
prots then get rebated lump-sum to the patient households. The resulting rst order conditions
are described in Appendix B.
The aggregate stock of housing (available to both types of households and the entrepreneurs)
evolves according to the following transition equation:
Ht+1 =

1  h

Ht + I
h
t+1 k
2.5 The Central Bank
We assume that the central bank credibly targets ination and output gap by adopting a variation
of the Taylor rule commonly used in the monetary literature:
ln (Rt) = (1  i) ln
 
R

+ i ln (Rt 1) + (1  i)

t + yy
gap
t

(13)
R = 1p is the steady state level of the interest rate, and i measures the degree of interest rate
inertia. As a matter of robustness check, we study the model behavior under two di¤erent spec-
ications of output gap: rst as a deviation of output from its exible price level, and then as a
deviation from its previous period level. We also verify the results by setting y = 0.
13
2.6 Measure of National Welfare
A natural (and commonly used) measure of the national welfare is the aggregate utility (or value
function) of all the domestic households:
Ut = U
p
t + U
m
t + U
e
t ;
12First Research Industry Prole.
13We were unable to achieve numerical convergence in the model with exible output gap for construction lag
lengths of 1 or 8, or for reparameterizations of the benchmark model. However, the qualitative welfare results are
the same regardless of the denition of output gap (and even in the version with no output gap); we will use the
more stable version with the output growth gap in the discussion below.
7
where Upt and U
m
t , both described by (1), represent the total utility of patient and impatient
households, respectively, and Uet (from equation (7)) is the utility of entrepreneurs.
14
These components of the value function will allow us to make quantiable comparisons of con-
sumer and entrepreneur welfare across di¤erent specications of the model. To see how this can
be done, let ~Upt correspond to some benchmark specication of the economy (for example, with no
price rigidity, so !p = 0) and let U
p
t be the utility of patient households from a di¤erent specication
(to follow the above example, let !p = 0:5). Then, in the case of log utility, the di¤erence, denoted
by p, between the two value functions
p  Upt   ~Upt
can be interpreted as cost to patient households, expressed as percent of their steady state con-
sumption, of moving away from the benchmark specication to (in the above example) the economy
with nominal rigidities.15 Analogously, m  Umt   ~Umt and e  Uet   ~Uet will allow us to compare
the welfare of impatient households and entrepreneurs in the two scenarios. We thus can draw
inferences not only about the total welfare of the economy (  p+ m+ e), but also about welfare
trade-o¤s between the three groups of agents.
2.7 Equilibrium
The following market clearing conditions complete the description of the model.
Yt = C
p
t + C
m
t + C
e
t + I
k
t + K;t (14)
Lpt = N
p
e;t +N
p
c;t (15)
Lmt = N
m
e;t +N
m
c;t (16)
 Bpt = Bmt +Bet +Bct (17)
Ht = H
p
t +H
m
t +H
e
t (18)
Equilibrium in the economy is dened by (14)-(18) and the rst order conditions of the agents,
given the form of monetary policy rule described above. The model was solved numerically using
Dynare (see Collard and Juillard (2003)). First order approximations were used to compute mo-
ments, variance decompositions and impulse response functions presented below; value functions
were calculated using second-order approximations to the model.
3 Estimation and Calibration
The model is calibrated to Spain; each time period corresponds to one quarter. Table 1 summarizes
the key parameters of our model. Many of these values are common in the RBC/monetary literature;
a few others merit further description.
The values of the rst group of the model parameters are fairly standard; we set p = 0:99,
 = 1,  = 0:03, and  = 0:3. Next, we calibrate elasticities of labor supply and varieties
14Since the total measure of patient households is 1, and each is representative in its choices of consumption, labor
and housing, the total utility of the group is equal to the utility of each individual household. The same argument
holds for impatient households and entrepreneurs.
15See Mykhaylova (2009) for details.
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Parameter Description Value
 Relative risk aversion 1.00
 Inverse of Frisch labor elasticity 3.00
p Discount factor of patient households 0.99
m Discount factor of impatient households 0.95
e;c Discount factor of entrepreneurs and the construction sector 0.96
 Weight on housing services for households 0.25
 Income share of patient households 0.79
 Capital share in the production function 0.30
 Real estate share in the production function 0.11
 Capital depreciation rate 0.03
 Capital adjustment cost 9.0
h Housing depreciation rate 0.006
 Elasticity of substitution between goods varieties 3.90
 Elasticity of substitution between labor varieties 4.30
!p Price stickiness 0.75
!w Wage stickiness 0.75
lm LTV ratio for impatient households 0.76
le; lc LTV ratio for entrepreneurs and the construction sector 0.27
Table 1: Benchmark parameter values
substitution, which we take from a variant of IMFs Global Economy Model (GEM).16 We set
 = 3,  = 3:9 and  = 4:3 (the latter two resulting in a 35 percent and 30 percent markups of
price over marginal cost and wage over labor disutility, respectively).
Next we set the discount factors of impatient households, entrepreneurs and the construction
sector. While the values of these parameters have limited e¤ects on the dynamics of the model,
it is important to set them such that the credit constraints are binding in and around the steady
state. To this end, we x the discount factor of impatient households m at 0:95. We assume that
the internal rate of return of the entrepreneurs and the construction sector is four times larger than
the equilbirium real rate; therefore, we set e = c = 0:96: As a rst pass, we follow Iacoviello and
Neri (2010) and set , the income share of patient households, to 0:79, and the housing adjustment
cost parameters to 0.
The parameter  controls the stock of residential housing relative to annual output: setting
 = 0:25 xes the ratio at around 400 percent, in line with the data from the Spanish housing
market (see Appendix A for data sources and description). A consideration particular to Spain is
the issue of foreign ownership in the housing market. If the share of foreigner-owned houses is high,
then xing the housing stock to GDP ratio at 400 percent can overstate the importance of housing
price transmission mechanism in our model. While the Bank of Spain does not o¤er the breakdown
of housing stock between local residents and foreigners, it reports the share of foreign investment
in property as a percentage of GDP, which stands at only one sixteenth of total investment in
residential housing. However, since  is an important parameter of the model, below we perform
robustness check by setting  = 0:1, a level consistent with the U.S. housing market indicators.
We set v, the elasticity of output to entrepreneurial real estate, to 0.11. This number implies a
16See Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti (2004) for details.
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plausible 50 percent annual steady-state ratio of commercial real estate to GDP. The depreciation
rate for housing h is set equal to 0.006. This number pins down the ratio of residential investment
to total output at around 9 percent, as in the data.
We calibrate investment adjustment cost parameter to match the moments of the model to the
data. For the period 1980:Q1-2008:Q4, the ratio of standard deviations of investment to output in
the data is 1.81; to replicate this in the model, we set  = 9.
We set the price and wage stickiness parameters !p = !w to 0.75, which implies that prices
and wages are reset on average every four quarters. This value of !p is based on recent empirical
research on the degree of price rigidity in the Euro area, which shows that the average duration of
a price contract ranges from 4 to 5 quarters.17 Finally, we normalize the amount of land available
to the construction sector to unity: T = 1.
Credit constraint parameters are calibrated using Spanish credit market data. During the 2004-
2008 period, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio for an average household was 0.62. We assume that
impatient households borrow more than the average amount; therefore, we set lm = 0:76, which
implies a 36 percent household credit to GDP ratio, close to 42 percent observed in the data for
the 1997-2008 period. Due to lack of data on LTV ratios for entrepreneurs and construction sector,
we set le = lc = 0:27 to match the implied 52 percent steady state business credit to GDP ratio to
the Spanish data.
Finally, we estimate the parameters of the productivity process as follows: a = 0:67 and the
standard deviation of the shock a" = 0:005 (see Appendix C for details).
The coe¢ cients for the monetary policy rule are taken from Díaz-Roldán and Montero-Soler
(2004); these are estimated using Spanish data for the period 1989:3 to 1998:4, i.e., after Spain had
joined the European Monetary System. We set i = 0:63,  = 2:30 and y = 0:39. We estimate
the standard deviation of the shock to the interest rate to be i" = 0:006 during the same period.
4 Results
4.1 The Role of the Construction Sector
To more clearly demonstrate the importance of construction sector for the dynamics of housing
investment and prices, and for easier comparisons with existing literature, Figure 1 contrasts our
model with a simplied version where housing supply is xed (which can alternately be thought
of as an innite lag in the construction sector, k = 1).18 Our rst observation is that, compared
to the setup with no construction, allowing housing supply to respond endogenously and contem-
poraneously (k = 0) to demand pressures unsurprisingly works to reduce the volatility of housing
prices. A positive shock to technology or a sudden lowering of interest rates increase demand for
housing both through the positive wealth e¤ect and, as a result of higher real estate prices, by
relaxing borrowing limits of credit-constrained agents (the nancial accelerator approach outlined
in Bernanke et al. (1999)).
More importantly, when we increase construction sector lags to 4 and then 8 quarters, the
responsiveness of residential investment to economic shocks declines, and housing price volatility
goes up, in fact above its no-construction scenario level. The mechanism behind this surprising
result is most easily understood following a positive technology shock (left column of Figure 1).
17See, for example, Dhyne et al. (2006) and Gorter (2005).
18More precisely, we eliminate the construction sector from the model, x the aggregate housing stock Ht for all
periods at its steady state level in the full-blown specication, and set h = 0.
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Figure 1: Impulse response functions of housing investment and prices following a shock to productivity
(left column) and interest rate (right column): the impact of construction delays.
Higher productivity in the goods production sector drives up the wages of both types of households.
Construction sector reduces its investment (vis-à-vis the no-delay scenario) in response to higher
labor costs and, more importantly, because it internalizes the fact that demand for housing will be
lower than its current level when the new houses nally come up for sale. With 8 period delays,
aggregate housing stock actually declines while consumer demand is still above its steady state
level; this can be most clearly seen in Figure 2.
These results indicate that in model specications with non-zero lags in construction higher
demand (as a result of positive developments in the economy), coupled with the eventual decline in
housing supply, drives up housing prices to a higher level than would be observed if the aggregate
stock of housing were permanently xed, or if the construction sector were able to supply new
housing immediately following the shock. This mechanism is going to be of particular importance in
explaining why our welfare computations and subsequent prescription for monetary policy regarding
housing prices di¤er signicantly from the ndings of existing literature.
4.2 Performance of the Model
Table 2 compares moments of the data with those of the model for three di¤erent construction lags
k = 0; 4; 8, and for the specication with no construction sector. Before proceeding, we would like to
point out that the goal of our paper is to study the importance of construction delays for improving
the t (in particular, of correlations between housing investment, its lags and leads, housing prices
and output, none of which can be studied in models without housing construction sector) and
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions (following a shock to productivity) of aggregate housing stock for
various specications of construction lag delays.
policy prescriptions of the model, rather than matching all of its business cycle moments to the
data. In fact, our model is ill-equipped to match the data perfectly, since it only includes two shocks.
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2009) point out that many New Keynesian DSGE models su¤er from
presence of what the authors call "dubiously structural" shocks, which are not derived from easily
interpretable primitives and therefore may give rise to conicting policy prescriptions. For this
reason, we include only the arguably non-controversial and easily measurable shocks: technology
and interest rates.
Given the small number of shocks in the model, it nonetheless can capture fairly well many
moments of the data, including the cyclicality and patterns of comovement between the key com-
ponents of aggregate demand. More important, however, is the evidence in support of our main
thesis: adding construction delays to the model does improve its t along several dimensions.
Longer delays in construction decrease the elasticity of housing supply and therefore lead to
higher volatility of housing prices. Lower supply responsiveness also causes workers to switch
more frequently between the two sectors of the economy: construction and goods production, thus
increasing volatility of total hours in construction, Nc  Npc + Nmc (as was discussed above). On
the other hand, time-to-build lags do (by construction) perform poorly in matching the relative
volatility of housing investment.
The version of the model with k = 0 overstates all of the correlations between housing variables
and output. By increasing the length of construction lags and thus slowing down the responsiveness
of housing investment, we are able to achieve lower correlations between the latter and other key
variables of the model: output, housing prices and non-residential investment.
We are also able to study the lead-lag patterns of the housing investment vis-à-vis output. In
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Data k = 0 k = 4 k = 8 k =1
% Standard dev. GDP 1.37 2.60 2.28 2.21 2.60
(relative to GDP) Q 3.67 0.48 0.61 0.66 0.58
Ih 3.67 3.75 1.48 1.27 -
N c 2.25 0.82 0.84 1.34 -
Correlations GDP t; I
h
t 0.69 0.95 0.86 0.74 -
Iht ; Qt 0.65 0.94 0.76 0.60 -
Iht ; I
k
t 0.72 0.98 0.81 0.66 -
Lead/Lags Iht 1; GDP t 0.61 0.68 0.64 0.54 -
Iht+1; GDP t 0.52 0.93 0.84 0.71 -
Ikt 1; GDP t 0.68 0.70 0.70 0.68 0.70
Ikt+1; GDP t 0.58 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.96
Table 2: Business cycle properties of the model. Numbers in the "Data" column correspond to H-P ltered
natural logs of raw data. Column "k =1" refers to the version of the model with xed aggregate housing
stock.
the data, the strongest correlation between output and investment is contemporaneous, followed
by investment lag and then lead, in that order. In our model, the highest correlation between the
two is also contemporaneous, with the best quantitative match occurring for k = 8, but residential
investment in all specications is leading the cycle more strongly than it is lagging.
4.3 Monetary Policy and Welfare Analysis
We now turn to the question of monetary policy conduct in the presence of such delays. Under
the current setup, both the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), tracked by the ECB,
and Spanish CPI have a limited coverage of housing prices: they include consumer expenditure
on housing services by renters but not by home owners. However, close to 85% of Spaniards
are homeowners.19 Rental prices are much less volatile than average price of housing per square
foot (Ayuso and Restoy (2007)); therefore, the central banks e¤ectively do not respond to the
developments in the housing markets.
In this paper, we do not analytically derive the optimal monetary policy rule; instead, we
engage in the following thought experiment. According to the common macroeconomic wisdom, in
a standard New Keynesian DSGE model the consumer welfare maximizing monetary policy targets
a weighted average of ination and output gap.20 Let us redene the householdsutility function
(with  = 1) as follows:
U jt = E0
1X
t=0

j
t8><>:lnCjt  
h
Ljt
i1+
1 + 
9>=>; ; j 2 fp;mg
with Cjt  Cjt
h
Hjt
i
denoting the housing-consumption bundle. The corresponding price ination
19Diewert (2002), Goodhart and Hofmann (2007).
20See, for example, Woodford (2003, Chapter 6).
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k = 0 k = 4 k = 8 k =1
Patient 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.02
Impatient 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.03
Entrepreneurs 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01
Aggregate 0.05 0.05 0.28 0.06
Table 3: Welfare gains, as a percent of steady state consumption, from increasing q from 0 to 0:3.
of the bundle evolves over time as follows:
aggt = t + qqt; (19)
where q  +1 and qt is the change from last period of the real housing price.
We modify (13) by letting the central bank target this aggregate measure of ination21 :
ln (Rt) = (1  i) ln
 
R

+ i ln (Rt 1) + (1  i)


 
t + qqt

+ yy
gap

Finally, we compute welfare gains that result when q is increased from 0 (the standard Taylor Rule)
to 0:3, a value slightly above the one dictated by (19) for  = 0:25. The results of our calculations
are presented in Table 3.
One of the main ndings of our paper is that adding housing prices to the monetary policy
function sizably improves welfare of all agents in the model for construction lags greater than zero.
When we look at specications with no lags or with xed housing supply (the setup considered
in most papers on housing prices and monetary policy, which corresponds to columns 2 and 5 in
Table 3), our results are consistent with the existing literature - adding housing prices to the Taylor
rule does not signicantly change agentswelfare. We address the source of this discrepancy after
elucidating the mechanism generating welfare gains at long construction lags.
Our calculations suggest that we must consider the di¤erences between credit-constrained and
unconstrained agents. To that end, Table 4 shows volatilities of variables that are relevant for
welfare calculations of the three agent types.
Cp Hp Cm Hm Bm Ce Be Q
q= 0 0.015 0.004 0.042 0.058 0.044 0.032 0.027 0.015
q= 0:3 0.013 0.004 0.039 0.052 0.040 0.029 0.024 0.013
Table 4: Standard deviations of the components of agentswelfare in the 8-period lag setup.
Entrepreneurs derive utility only from consumption; the reduced volatility of housing prices
(as the result of more interventionist monetary policy) therefore benets them only to the extent
that it reduces the variance of their borrowing limit. Since entrepreneurs borrow against future
value of their housing stock (see equation (9)), more stable housing prices allow them to better
smooth their consumption. Same argument applies to credit-constrained households. Additionally,
both types of households derive direct utility from their housing stocks, which become more stable
21 It is worth emphasizing that our model di¤ers from the one considered by Woodford (2003) in a number of ways,
in particular due to the presence of credit constraints. Therefore, we do not claim that this expanded policy rule
is "optimal" in the sense of being derived from the model equations; we merely use it as a guide in modifying the
monetary policy function.
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when monetary policy targets housing prices more aggressively. This is due to the fact that the
construction sector, which relies heavily on expectation of future economic conditions when making
its investment decisions, benets from more stable and predictable housing prices and is able to
better stabilize its housing supply.
Thus, monetary policy that stabilizes housing prices becomes more important to impatient
households and entrepreneurs (because of borrowing constraints) and to both types of households
(because of housing in the utility) as the responsiveness of housing supply decreases due to longer
delays in the construction sector.
The last column of Table 3 shows the welfare gains for the specication with xed housing stock.
The gains are non-linear in the duration of the lag, going back to almost zero if the construction
sector is not included at all; this results explains the ndings of the existing literature (which either
does not model the construction sector, or ignores time-to-build phenomenon) that welfare gains
from housing price stabilizations are negligible. What is the cause of this non-linearity?
Section 4.1 and Figure (2) describe the behavior of housing stock following a positive shock to
productivity for a range of construction lags. A no-lag construction sector responds to an increase in
demand for housing (itself generated by a positive wealth e¤ect) by immediately increasing housing
supply. However, when construction lag is increased to 8 periods, housing stock actually falls after
experiencing an insignicant increase. This "perverse" response is worse (from the demand-side
perspective) than the no-construction scenario; hence, gains from housing price stabilization are
larger compared to the xed housing stock case. Additionally, longer delays in construction add to
overall uncertainty in the model, compared to the situation when housing stock is xed permanently,
thus dampening economic activity and generating welfare losses.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
The two mechanisms that explain our welfare ndings depend on having housing in the utility func-
tion and on the presence of credit constraints. Below, we perform robustness checks to determine
how important is the calibration of the parameters generating these mechanisms for the results of
our paper.
Construction sector is particularly important to the Spanish economy; real estate markets in
Spain and several other European nations have experienced large uctuations during the last decade,
and so, according to our model, stand to gain from incorporating housing prices into monetary
policy. It is possible, however, that the large welfare gains documented in this paper are due to the
relatively heavy weight assigned to housing services in consumer utility (governed by the parameter
). Therefore, we test the sensitivity of our results by assigning a lower weight to housing services
to check whether our policy prescriptions are applicable to other countries as well. We lower  to
0.1, which results in a 170 percent residential housing to GDP ratio, close to the level observed
in the U.S.22 At the same time, we lower q in the central bank policy rule to 0.1, as dictated by
(19). Left panel of Table 5 presents the results of this robustness experiment. As expected, lower
weight on housing services leads to smaller welfare gains from housing price stabilization, although
the latter are still signicant for 8 period construction lag delays.
A high LTV ratio could also increase the size of welfare gains documented in the previous section,
since it implies a higher level of credit in the economy and, therefore, a stronger nancial accelerator
channel and more room for welfare improvements. To check the robustness of our results to the
22 Iacoviello (2005) sets the weight assigned to housing services in the utility function to 0.1, which xes the housing
stock to GDP ratio at 140 percent, in line with the U.S. data.
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 = 0:10 lm= 0:38
k = 0 k = 4 k = 8 k =1 k = 0 k = 4 k = 8 k =1
Patient 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.02
Impatient 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.02
Entrepreneurs 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01
Aggregate 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.31 0.05
Table 5: Welfare gains, as a percent of steady state consumption, from q from 0 to 0:3 for two reparame-
terizations of the benchmark model.
value of this parameter, we decrease the LTV ratio for impatient households by half; the results of
welfare computations are shown in the right panel of Table 5. Qualitatively, the welfare gains in
this new scenario are quite similar to those seen in the baseline model: all agent types benet from
the inclusion of housing prices into the monetary policy rule, with the size of the gains increasing
in construction lag. Thus, our main ndings remain unchanged for economies with less developed
nancial markets or smaller stocks of real estate relative to GDP.
5 Conclusion
We incorporate housing construction sector, characterized by time-to-build delays, into a DSGE
model where agents borrow against the value of their real estate holdings. The improvements
that arise from this new feature are twofold. First, we show that specications of the model with
delays between commencement and completion of a construction project t the data (in terms of
moments, correlations, and leads/lags of housing investment and prices) much better than a version
with no construction sector. Second, we show that, in the presence of such long lags in real estate
development, a forward-looking construction sector acts to lower housing supply following a positive
productivity shock, which warrants the inclusion of housing prices in the central bank policy rule.
The welfare gains from adding housing prices to the Taylor rule are non-negligible for all types
of agents; aggregate gains for the entire economy are on the order of 0.3 percent of steady state
consumption.
We nd that the welfare gains from housing price stabilization are non-linear in the duration
of construction lag, decreasing back to zero as the number of lags goes to innity (models with no
housing investment sector can be thought of as limiting cases of extremely long lags in construction).
Therefore, recent papers that do not incorporate time delays in housing construction, or that
permanently x housing supply, do not nd any noticeable welfare improvements from housing
price stabilization by central banks.
There are several ways to rene and extend the results of our paper. Business cycles properties
of the model can be improved by a more careful calibration of the various shocks that a¤ect housing
market. Di¤erentiating between renters and owners of real estate can yield further insights into the
dynamics of housing stock and prices. Construction sector behavior can be made more realistic by
endogenizing the duration of time delays. These suggestions o¤er fertile ground for future research.
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A Data Sources and Description
Data are taken from Eurostat, ECB, OECD and IMF (IFS) statistics databases.
Pt GDP deator for Spain. IFS
Yt GDP at constant prices, seasonally adjusted Eurostat
Qt
Pt
Real Spanish housing price OECD
Ht Stock of residential housing Banco de Espaµna
Ikt Business xed investment (non-residential) Eurostat
Iht Residential investment Eurostat
lm;e;c Loan-to-value ratios Banco de Espaµna
Lt Average hours per employee times the total employment. OECD
Nc Hours in the construction sector Eurostat
Ne Hours in the production sector Eurostat
Rt Spanish overnight interbank rate OECD
19
B Solution to Model
B.1 Patient Households FOCs
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B.3 Entrepreneurs FOCs
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B.4 Construction Sector FOCs
ct =
1
Rt
  c
W pt =
 (1  ) (c)k 1
Npc;t
Ict
 
ct+k 1l
c + c

EtQt+k
Wmt =
(1  ) (1  ) (c)k 1
Nmc;t
Ict
 
ct+k 1l
c + c

EtQt+k
Here c is the rate at which the construction sector discounts the future; in order to make the
credit constraint binding at all times, we require that c be su¢ ciently low relative to the lending
interest rate in the Home country.
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1990-2008
a 0:67
(4:51)
a" 5:46 10 3
Table 6: OLS estimate of the productivity process (t-stats in parentheses).
C Estimation
C.1 Productivity
We assume that in the short run, Spanish stocks of capital and real estate are xed; this allows us
to approximate total factor productivity (TFP) as lnAt = lnYt   (1    ) lnLt. (Details on the
variable denitions can be found in Appendix A.) We use 1980:Q1-2008:Q4 data on real output
and employment to compute the TFP series, and then estimate AR(1) process of the form
lnAt = a lnAt 1 + "
a
t ;
Table 6 presents our estimation results.
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